

SECRET

2 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: WFO

SUBJECT: IF-4 FBSTEAM - Extension of Project

1. The purpose of this project being to utilize the services, experiences and background of Dr. Gustav Hilger, and, since the employment of this individual will continue until at least 30 June 1950, it is requested that the project be extended, and that additional funds be allocated to provide for the payment of salary.

2. Full accounting has been made for funds advanced. The financial activity of the project is recorded as follows:

	1948 - 49	1949 - 50	Total
Allocated	\$6,285.00	\$4,100.00	\$10,385.00
Expendent	\$6,624.77	\$3,900.00	\$10,524.77
	339.77	\$ 200.00	\$ 139.77

3. Additional funds will be required as follows:

Salary  
16 January 1950  
to 30 June 1950 \$3,300.00

Signed  
Executive Officer, F&P

EJD/jer

- cc: 1) EJD's file  
1) CAG's file  
2) Registry, OFC

MAR 10 1950  
OFC REGISTRY  
100-12111  
MAR 2 1950

SECRET

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

8 March 1950

"Would not our psychological warfare objectives be extremely effectively furthered by our facilitating, through clandestine means, the Yugoslav propaganda offensive against the Comintern and Stalinism.

"Presumably, the Yugoslavs are already fairly effective in this campaign in Europe. The question so far as Europe is concerned is, 'Can they be made even more effective through stepped-up radio power and other necessary mechanical measures?' We have nothing to offer in the way of ideas. Tito's propagandists are obviously far more astute and experienced in this type of operation than anyone in this country.

"Even more important than Europe, it would seem, is Communist Asia as a target for Yugoslav propaganda. Hebler is quoted in an interview with the New York Times early last week, the week of October 8, 1949, as having said that the Chinese Communists do not have information on the Yugoslav case. Should we not do everything possible, within a strictly clandestine framework, to enable the Yugoslavs to get their story to the Chinese, North Koreans, the Vietn and the Burmese. This is not to say that we should do the translating and distribution of Yugoslav material, even through cut-outs, but that we overtly facilitate the Yugoslavs themselves to take their message to the Asiatic Communists--perhaps even overtly, but certainly on their own."

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In view of the revelation of the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and of the Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh, do you have any comments which might supplement your memorandum of 8 February 1950, which consisted of your reaction to the above proposition?